Introduction
What do Channel 4, Companies House, the Post Office, the Royal Bank of Scotland, the Royal Mint and URENCO (a nuclear fuel company), have in common? All of them have their financial relationships with the British government managed by an agency, UK Government Investments (UKGI).
All of these organisations finance their activities through charges made to various categories of user; all of them are subject to strong state engagement because all are perceived as serving a wider public purpose.
This diverse list of organisations may be described as hybridsneither branches of government, nor commercial organisations, but with some of the characteristics of each. The term 'UK Government Investments' is misleading because the government financial involvement in these activities is not substantially based on an investment motive and any change to that involvement would rightly be the subject of public interest and scrutiny.
There are also many hybrid organisations outside the remit of UKGI: the BBC; museums and galleries; the Royal Parks; NHS hospital trusts; Heathrow Airport; the Bank of England; universities; the Corporation of London; privatised water and rail companies; newly created academies in secondary education; etc. That is before noting the many private businesses which derive much of their revenue from public sector activities: care home providers; companies with extensive outsourcing businesses; defence contractors. Then there is a wide range of public buildings and infrastructure assets are owned through special purpose vehicles; for example, the iconic Treasury building is leased to and from a private company which undertook and financed an extensive refurbishment.
For each hybrid, a related group of issues arises. What is the governance structure, and how does it reflect the wider public interest in these businesses? What is the capital structure, and in particular how is the equity obtained? What is the administrative procedure which takes control of these organisations if they fail, either financially or in terms of their wider societal objectives? It is evident simply from posing these questions that there are no common answers to them. Indeed in several cases it is not at all clear what the answers to these questions are. Even within UKGI, there appears to be little read across on these matters between organisations -no systematic analysis of what works well and what does not. This paper is a preliminary attempt to raise these issues. Such hybrids account for at least one quarter of all economic activity in the UK, and, given the structure of the Welsh economy, it is likely that this proportion is even higher in Wales.
Why hybrids?
A century ago, Max Weber famously identified the defining characteristic of the state as the monopoly of legitimate coercion within a territory (Weber (2015) pp. 135-6). In the 19th century, the principal functions of the state were essentially coercive.
Although the modern state continues to exercise these functions, it is primarily engaged in the delivery of services. We look to it to provide health and education, and these are the principal items in the budgets of most such states. Government provides transport infrastructure, and collects the rubbish; it ensures that taps flow with water and that electricity sockets are live. There is even an expectation that the state, or its agencies, provide entertainment on television and ensure fast internet connections.
The principal criterion for assessing performance in coercive activity is the legitimacy of the process. Judges and police officers are expected to adhere to the dictates of the law: if someone goes to prison it should be because they have committed a specified offence, not because they are thought to be a bad person.
Likewise tax inspectors and benefit clerks are expected to collect and disburse according to the rules, not by reference to what they think is fair. However when the state delivers services, the principal concern is with the quality of the services. For example, we are not interested in how rubbish is collected: we just want it taken away. A good school is one which provides a good education for our children. We want comfortable and reliable trains, and the question of who provides the train is relevant only to the extent that it bears on these outcomes.
If the service can be provided in a competitive market, exit is generally a more effective mechanism of control than voice. If we do not like what a supermarket provides, we patronise another supermarket next time. This exercise of choice is generally a more powerful spur to innovation and improvement than complaint. Eastern European supermarkets were glum places, and Britain's once proud cooperative grocery stores went into decline under the supervision of people whose primary concerns were ideological rather than in ensuring that the shelves were stocked with the things its customers wanted to buy (Myners, 2014) . Nationalised industries suffered, and schools and hospitals still do, from the infiltration of producer interest groups into the supposed mechanisms of democratic control. Duty to promote the success of the company (1) A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to- This formulation is intentionally ambiguous. It cannot be interpreted as 'the purpose of the companies to maximise profits': the duty of the board of a company is to promote the success of the company, not the interests of its shareholders. However, the statute acknowledges that since the shareholders are residual claimants on the revenues and assets of the company it is likely that promoting the success of the company will benefit the members. Thus section 172 appears to give shareholders priority, while requiring the board to have regard to the interests of the stakeholder groups -employees, suppliers, customers and the community -and to sustain the corporate reputation. Before the bankruptcy of Enron, the water regulator had required that its subsidiary, Wessex Water, was ringfenced, so that the creditors of the American parent had no recourse to the assets of the subsidiary, and the company was sold as a going concern without any consequence for water supply. Ringfencing of retail banks is also due to come into effect next year. There are no provisions for special administration in electricity analogous to those in rail and water; Enron also owned a power station in Teesside and it appeared likely for a time that the facility would shut down, although a management buyout restored a viable financial structure. 
Objectives
What are we trying to achieve with hybrid structures? They originate because it is believed, correctly, that the function such organisations perform will be better achieved by the introduction of commercial disciplines of the kind implemented in wellmanaged private sector organisations. Such disciplines are adopted mostly as a result of the process of operating in a competitive market which requires firms to adopt the best -in the sense of most conducive to effectiveness of output -practices of other firms.
Commercial discipline should not be confused with 'the profit motive': this is not an end in itself, but sometimes a means to an end. What is meant by commercial discipline involves a number of different components, relevant to all kinds of organisation but with greater or lesser importance in particular cases.
First, commercial discipline involve the planning of operations and investment over periods longer than one year. The annual accounting cycle derives from a time when agriculture was a dominant form of economic activity and is inappropriate for most businesses today. For many hybrid activities, the relevant time horizons for investment and the development of organisational capabilities is particularly long.
Second, commercial discipline involves the delegation to executive management of responsibility for day-to-day decisions and further delegation to subordinates. Along with such delegation goes responsibility for outcomes -an emphasis on 'what has happened?' and 'has it worked?' rather than 'why did you do that?' and certainly not 'why are you doing that?' It is the shift from control of process to responsibility for outcomes which distinguishes appropriately hybrid organisation from other public sector functions. That is not say that the delegation of authority and outcome is not relevant to other public sector activities -the central and difficult management skill of the police chief or army commander is to give juniors authority to act quickly within a highly disciplined framework -but the balance of emphasis is different.
Third, while both day-to-day and strategic management is the responsibility of an executive team, such development is within the context of an overarching framework which reflects the variety of legitimate public and private interests in the activities of the organisation. For the public limited company, that overarching framework is provided by the board, and to some degree by the asset manager in major institutional investors. It is also the board which has responsibility for the appointment of executive management. That raises the question of who appoints the board. In the context of a large public limited company, the board is effectively selfperpetuating; for smaller companies with concentrated shareholdings, responsibility for board appointment lies with these shareholders.
In the case of more or less every hybrid described in this paper, the answers to the questions of accountability and responsibility are complex. This may reflect a genuine difficulty of assimilating a variety of stakeholder interests, but in many cases the answers are simply opaque and obscure.
Fourth, whatever the mechanisms of responsibility and accountability, they should be robust against interest group capture. In the private sector, the mantra of shareholder value has often recently been cover for capture by senior executives as an interest group, most evidently seen in explosion of their remuneration. Before the global financial crisis, some financial companies were plainly run more or less entirely for the benefit of senior employees.
Capture by a broader group of employees, mostly through the activities of trade unions, was a major problem in British nationalised industries. Indeed one of the drivers of privatisation was the Thatcher government's attack on union power in these sectors. The refocusing of union organisation toward public sector professional workers has transferred the locus of this issue to other areas of hybrid activity such as schools and hospitals, while universities have always been employee-dominated organisations. While the interests of private-sector managers and low-skilled public-sector workers were primarily financial, these white-collar groups have broader concerns, with a particular emphasis on personal autonomy.
The emphasis above on the commonality of issues and problems in the corporate and hybrid sectors invites the question 'what are the differences?'
The best answer to that is that corporate organisation works best when the value of corporate output is reasonably well measured by the revenue derived from customers.
Hybrids are mostly found in activities where revenue is not a good measure of the value of output.
That observation prompts the question of whether better metrics could be derived for the hybrid sector. When Gavyn Davies was chairman of the BBC, he promoted the idea that the BBC should be judged by the 'public value' that it created (Davies 2004 UKGI is staffed principally by people with experience in corporate finance and investment banking. This is plainly useful when the government's objective is to sell shares in the hybrid. However only in a small number even of the hybrids in which UKGI is involved is
